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Why are Trade Agreements Regional?  
Summary 
This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in 
which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition 
formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a familiar 
problem of coordination failure arises giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of 
many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, and 
through strategic interaction in tariff setting, regional trade agreements generate larger 
rent-shifting effects than non regional agreements, which countries use to coordinate on 
a unique equilibrium. Under naive best responses, regional agreements give way to free 
trade. 
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Recent empirical research presents substantive evidence that trade agreements (TAs) are
regional.3 The theoretical literature provides support for this ﬁnding. It shows that the
potential gains to a regional agreement are higher than to a non-regional agreement, and
that non-regional agreements may even be trade diverting. But no attempt has been made
before to provide a theory of how TAs might actually form into regional structures.4
This paper puts forward a theory of regional TA formation. It argues that there is
a coordination problem at the heart of the TA formation process, and countries seek TAs
that are regional as a way to solve that problem. There is undoubtedly signiﬁcant ‘pre-play
communication’ between policy-makers before a TA is formed. This observation is used in
the past literature to set aside problems of coordination. But in fact, the need for pre-play
communication actually implies that there is a coordination problem to be resolved as part
of the TA formation process. The main point brought to light in this paper, by setting
the issue of coordination center stage, is that countries can use geographical organization to
solve their coordination problem. Thus, each country seeks other countries in its region, and
only countries in its region, when forming a TA.
The model is based on Brander and Spencer (1984) and Yi (1996). Brander and Spencer
3Prominent examples of regional TAs are the European Union (EU), the Mercado Comun del Cono Sur
(MERCOSUR) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). More generally, for a sample of
54 countries, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) show that (the inverse of) distance is a good predictor of TA
membership. Non-regional agreements do exist of course, such as the recently signed TA between the US
and South Korea. But evidently they are the exception rather than the rule.
TA is a ‘catch all’ term that refers to all agreements in which a group of countries commit to trade among
members preferentially. This encompasses free trade agreements (FTAs) in which members agree to remove
internal tariﬀ barriers but set external tariﬀs independently, and customs unions (CUs) which are like FTAs
but with the additional requirement that members coordinate on common external tariﬀs. In practice, FTAs
are more common but most of the academic literature focuses on CUs because they are analytically easier to
handle. To focus the discussion on the regional nature of these agreements rather than the technical details
of their operation, we will use the catch-all term TA wherever possible (but distinctions between trading
arrangements will be made where relevant.)
4There is a literature that looks at the feasibility of preferential trade agreements when countries cannot
write binding contracts over tariﬀs; see for example Bagwell and Staiger, (1997a,b), (1999), Bond and
Syropoulos (1996), Bond (2001), Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (2001), Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos
(2004) and Saggi (2006). All of these previous papers look at how agreements between suﬃciently patient
countries may be sustained through repeated interactions in the face of a short-run incentive to deviate.
In the model of this present paper, there is no short-run incentive to deviate. The problem focused on
instead is whether a country is able to form an agreement with the other countries that it would like to
have as members - the problem of coordination. This is diﬀerent from the coordination failure considered
by McClaren (2002), which is between the ﬁrms and their government in each country.
1(1984) show, in a two-country model, that rents made by foreign ﬁrms in the domestic market
can be shifted back home by the government using tariﬀs. Yi (1996) uses a Brander-Spencer
type model to show that a group of countries may obtain a higher payoﬀ from TA formation
than from moving to free trade. The present paper takes a special case of Yi’s model in
which goods are homogeneous and extends it by putting it in a regional setting.5
One of Yi’s key results shows that a country would always prefer to leave its own TA
in order to join another TA of equal or larger size, since the new TA that forms eliminates
greater harmful rent-shifting eﬀects and confers greater terms-of-trade beneﬁts. However,
in the present paper, a new eﬀect is revealed when a regional dimension is introduced to
the model. Without an agreement, since more rents are dissipated through transportation
between regions than within them, there is more scope for rent-shifting within a region than
across regions. TA formation within a region eliminates this greater harmful rent shifting
among members, and in addition has greater beneﬁcial terms-of-trade eﬀects. Therefore, the
value to a member of joining a regional TA of a given size is greater than the value of a TA
across regions. This eﬀect tends to push the countries of a region towards the formation of
a regional TA.
In order to see the intuition behind this eﬀect, consider the original proposals made in
the 1960s for NAFTA - the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement - between Canada, the
UK and the US. Interpreted within the context of the present model, Canada and the US
would have liked the UK to form a TA with them, but the UK ultimately obtained a higher
payoﬀ from the formation of an agreement with nearby EU nations. This was so because the
gains to elimination of rent shifting within Europe and the terms-of-trade gains over North
America were of greater value to the UK.6
To introduce the problem of coordination failure in the present context, TA formation is
5Yi (1996) compares how ‘open regionalism’ can help with the attainment of free trade compared to the
outcome under ‘exclusive regionalism’ in which TA membership must be unanimous. The present paper draws
on Yi’s analysis of exclusive regionalism and it does not address the question of whether open regionalism
would be beneﬁcial in a regional setting. In his study of exclusive regionalism, Yi (1996) identiﬁes the stable
equilibrium structure of TAs; an approach pioneered by Riezman (1985) that will be extended to a regional
setting in the present paper.
6The underlying intuition is robust to the fact that the NAFTA proposals were obviously for an FTA
while the EU is a CU. In a broader setting, the choice of trading arrangement may have a signiﬁcant bearing
on the outcome. This point is made by Riezman (1999), who endogenizes the decision by countries over
whether to adopt a CU or FTA, showing that the choice of regime may aﬀect whether free trade can be
reached. (Also see Bloch’s 2003 discussion of CUs versus FTAs, and Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos 2004.)
2modeled based on Hart and Kurz’s (1983) simultaneous move exclusive membership game. In
their original game, simultaneously and without communicating, each player writes down a
list of other players with whom she would like to form a coalition. The lists form intersecting
sets of players and each of the intersecting sets forms a coalition. But if two players fail to
name each other then neither ends up in the same coalition even if it would have been
mutually beneﬁcial.7
In the model of the present paper each and every country, simultaneously and without
communicating, writes down a list of others with whom it would like to form a TA. When
transport costs between all countries are zero, so in eﬀect there is no regional dimension
to the model, the problem of coordination failure arises between them. Any one of many
possible TAs may arise in equilibrium. When transport costs of trading between regions are
greater than zero (but not large enough to prohibit trade between regions) countries use the
diﬀerence in rent-shifting eﬀects within and between regions to coordinate on regional TA
formation. TAs form simultaneously, one in each region, and each TA includes all countries
in that region. This is the sense in which the coordination problem is resolved when a
regional dimension is introduced to the model. The model is highly stylized, particularly
in terms of its regional structure. Nevertheless, even though strong assumptions are made
about functional forms and the TA formation process, the results seem intuitively plausible
and may be indicative of a general driving force towards regionalism for which there appears
to be substantial evidence.
In general terms, the literature on regionalism addresses two issues. The ﬁrst issue,
which was the focus of Viner (1950) in his seminal work on the topic, concerns the welfare
eﬀects of TA formation and expansion. The second issue is with the stability of TAs. Given
endogenous TA formation, what TA structures are stable? Are trade blocks conducive to or
inimical to the eventual attainment of free trade? (see Bhagwati 1993, although the roots
of this question are found in Viner 1950). We will address both issues in this paper .
Firstly, standard results will be shown to carry over to the regional setting of the present
paper in that TA formation and expansion tends to increase aggregate member welfare and
hurts non-members. But we will add that a regional TA is worth more to its members than
a non-regional block through rent-shifting and terms-of-trade eﬀects.
7See Bloch 2003 and Yi 2003 for reviews the literature on coalition formation.
3Secondly, we will examine the issue of stability by considering the dynamics of regional
TA formation. Yi (1996) argues that an equilibrium TA structure must be asymmetric.
Countries use the advantage in the sequence of TA formation that they are exogenously
granted to form a larger TA. The countries in the larger TA are better oﬀ even than under free
trade because they enjoy more favorable terms-of-trade eﬀects over non-member countries.
As a result, TAs are inimical to the eventual attainment of free trade. In the present paper, no
such advantages arise due to the fact that TA formation is simultaneous and so each country
is uncertain about the outcome of the TA formation process. As a result TA formation can
be symmetric, with no larger TA arising that would prefer the status quo to free trade. In
that case regional TAs do ultimately facilitate free trade.8
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic trade model and uses
it to explore the economic eﬀects of TA formation in regions. Section 3 introduces the
TA formation game. Section 4 shows that, in the TA formation game, when transport
costs are zero there are multiple equilibria and no predictions can be made as to which will
prevail. Section 5 then shows that when transport costs are greater than zero this provides a
mechanism through which countries are able to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which
regional TAs form. Section 6 then examines the extent to which regional TA formation may
subsequently give way to free trade. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. A Model of Trade Agreements in Regions
We will work with a familiar model of international trade based on Cournot competition.
Let N be the set of countries. Each country, i, has a representative consumer, ﬁrm, and
government, each denoted by its corresponding country identiﬁer as i ∈ N.
There are six countries; N = {1,2,3,4,5,6}. This is diﬀerent from a standard TA
8The literature on the dynamic path of trade liberalization examines the possibility that TA formation
gives way to world free trade at a later stage. In addition to Riezman (1999) see Seidmann (2006) and
Aghion, Antras and Helpman (2007) for recent contributions. Building on Baldwin (1996), Krishna (1998)
shows how political interests can undermine the progression from regionalism. Ornelas (2005a,b) shows that
TAs may create problems for multilateral trade liberalization ‘through their own success;’ if governments
can adjust tariﬀs then they only support trade-creating TAs, but then non-member countries may prefer
to free-ride on such agreements, blocking a subsequent move to free trade. Ethier (1998) considers how
multilateral liberalization may give way to regionalism. See Bagwell and Staiger (1998) on how TAs under-
mine the principles by which multilateral trade liberalization is achieved. Also, see Bagwati, Greenaway and
Panagariya (1998) for a literature review on the dynamics of regionalism.
4formation model, which would typically have just three countries. In our model, there is a
regional structure that partitions our set, N, of six countries into two regions; R1 = {1,2,3}
and R2 = {4,5,6}. A three-country framework is the simplest possible framework in which
TA formation can be examined, since a minimum of two countries are required to form a TA
and at least one country must remain outside so that the eﬀects on a non-member can be
analyzed. To extend this simple basic approach to a regional setting requires a set-up based
on two regions, each of which has three countries.9
Regions are some distance apart from one another. Let dij measure the distance between
any two countries i,j ∈ N. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will say that if
countries i and j are not in the same region then dij = d while if i and j are in the same
region then dij = 0.
So that we can examine whether TA formation evolves towards free trade, we will make
the game of TA formation dynamic with three periods. The details of the game will be deﬁned
fully in due course, but it may be helpful to preview the game’s extensive form to put the
model in context. First, TA formation takes place. Next, taking trading arrangements as
given, ﬁrms make production decisions. Finally, consumption takes place. We will adopt the
usual inductive approach of solving this sequence backwards. Thus, in what follows it will
make sense to assume that ﬁrms take the structure of trade agreements, tariﬀs and demand
curves as given.
2.1. Preferences and Production
There are two goods in the model, denoted M and X. Good M is chosen as the numeraire.
Countries are endowed with equal quantities of M, which is transferred internationally to
settle the balance of trade. The term Mi measures consumption of M in country i. By
assumption, each country is endowed with a suﬃcient quantity of M to ensure that it
consumes a positive quantity in equilibrium.10
9This framework is general enough to demonstrate regionalism while being simple enough to yield clear-
cut analytical solutions. In the concluding section, we will discuss how the forces for regionalism under
discussion may be examined in a more realistic regional setting.
10Note that since all countries are endowed with M and produce X, there is no scope in the present model
for trade diversion. That is, TA formation cannot lower welfare by inducing countries to import more from
TA partners that do not have a comparative advantage. The gains and losses to TA formation here are driven
instead by strategic considerations; this is a common feature of the recent literature. In the conclusions we
will discuss possible extensions to a Heckscher-Ohlin setting in which trade diversion is possible.
5All the ﬁrms in the model, one in each country, produce the homogeneous product X.
We will use xij to denote the quantity produced for the market in country i by the ﬁrm in





Consumer preferences are approximated by the following quasi-linear function:





i + Mi, (2.2)
where e is a parameter. This functional form is relatively simple, focusing attention on the
impact of product diﬀerentiation by distance.11
The inverse demand curve of consumer i is obtained in the usual way by diﬀerentiating




= e − Xi. (2.3)
Firm j’s (marginal) cost to produce a unit of X for sale in country i consists of three
components: a private per unit cost, c, which is the same for all ﬁrms; the tariﬀ, tij, levied
by government i on imports from j; the transport cost, dij, of shipping from j to i. Thus,
ﬁrm j’s per-unit production cost for each market i is given by the function
cij = c + tij + dij. (2.4)
We will assume that ﬁrms perceive markets as being segmented, and so they compete
by choosing quantities in each country.12 Firm j chooses xij to maximize proﬁts in each
market i, denoted πij:
Max
{xij}
πij = (pi − cij)xij, (2.5)
where pi is determined according to the inverse demand curve pi (Xi) given by (2.3).
Setting the ﬁrst derivative of (2.5) equal to zero obtains the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm
j; pi −cij −xij = 0. Summing ﬁrst order conditions over all j ∈ N, in Cournot equilibrium,
xij =






− dij − tij. (2.6)
11This basic functional form for preferences is used quite widely in the literature on TAs; see Ornelas
(2005a) for example. Yi (1996) has a more general form which allows X to be horizontally diﬀerentiated.
The model of this present paper could be extended in that direction but this would complicate the analysis
considerably and would risk obscuring the eﬀects resulting from the organization of countries into regions.
12This assumption is made for analytical simplicity, but approximates the weaker assumption that ﬁrms
compete over capacities.
6Output for market i by ﬁrm j depends negatively on dij and tij; the smaller the distance
to market, and the lower the tariﬀ, the larger the rents available from shipping to country i
and so the higher the quantity produced. In contrast, output by ﬁrm j depends positively
on the distance from country i to all other markets and the tariﬀ set by country i on imports
from all countries other than j. Note that the strength of demand relative to cost helps to
determine the rents available to ﬁrm j as well; e − c is common to all markets and can be
made large enough to ensure that xij > 0 for all i, j.13
2.2. Trade Agreements and Trade Volumes
The structure of TAs in the world economy is deﬁned as follows. A TA structure B =
(B1,B2,...,Bm) is a partition of the set of countries N, where B1, B2, ... , Bm are TAs;
Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ for i 6= j, and ∪m
i=1Bi = N. If Bi has only one element then it is referred to as
a singleton; a country that does not coordinate trade policy with others.14
Recall that the location of each country is ﬁxed either in R1 or in R2. Therefore,
(Bk ∩ R1) ∪ (Bk ∩ R2) = Bk. Let bir be the number of country i’s TA partners that are
in the same region as country i, and let binr be the number of country i’s TA partners
that are in the “other” region.15 In the present simple regional set-up, bir ∈ {1,2,3} and
binr ∈ {0,1,2,3}.
Using (2.6), we can now express outputs produced for country i in terms of regional and
TA relationships. Let r stand for regional and nr stands for non-regional. Then tir is the
tariﬀ that country i sets on imports from non-members in the same region and tinr is the
tariﬀ set on imports from non-members in the other region. Let m stand for TA member
and let nm stand for non-member. Then we may use these mnemonics to classify outputs
13The solution for xij obviously depends on the assumption that there is only one ﬁrm in each country.
Some work has looked at how TA formation is aﬀected by a change in the number of ﬁrms; see in particular
Krishna (1998). From this earlier work, variation in ﬁrm numbers is most interesting when it is asymmetric.
But since in the present paper we have already introduced a regional asymmetry to the model, we will leave
aside formal analysis of variation in the number of ﬁrms across countries. We will discuss the probable eﬀect
of variation in the number of ﬁrms on our results in the conclusions.
14In coalition formation, relations between countries are transitive; if countries 1 and 2 have an agreement
and 2 and 3 have an agreement then 1 and 3 must have an agreement. In network formation, by contrast,
relations may be intransitive; even if countries 1 and 2 have an agreement, it does not follow that 1 and 3
must have an agreement. Because the TA formation that we will consider involves coordination over external
and internal tariﬀs, it implies a transitive relationship between members.
15Formally, if i ∈ Bk and i ∈ Rl then let bir be the cardinality of the set Bk ∩ Rl and let binr be the
cardinality of the set Bk ∩ Rm, l 6= m.
7into four basic terms.
Write xirm for output produced for country i by a country that is in the same region as
country i and is a member of country i’s TA:
xirm (tir,tinr;d) =
(e − c) + 3d + (3 − bir)tir + (3 − binr)tinr
7
. (2.7)
Write xinrm for output produced for country i by a country not in the same region but which
is a member of country i’s TA:
xinrm (tir,tinr;d) =
(e − c) − 4d + (3 − bir)tir + (3 − binr)tinr
7
. (2.8)
Write xirnm for output produced for country i by a country that is in the same region but
not a member of country i’s TA:
xirnm (tir,tinr;d) =
(e − c) + 3d − (4 + bir)tir + (3 − binr)tinr
7
. (2.9)
Finally, write xinrnm for output produced for country i by a country that is not in the same
region and is not a member of country i’s TA:
xinrnm (tir,tinr;d) =
(e − c) − 4d + (3 − bir)tir − (4 + binr)tinr
7
. (2.10)
Total output is given by
Xi (tir,tinr;d) = birxirm (tir,tinr;d) + (3 − bir)xirnm (tir,tinr;d)
+binrxinrm (tir,tinr;d) + (3 − binr)xinrnm (tir,tinr;d).
By (2.7), the greater is d and the higher are tir and tinr the greater the output produced by
a regional member of i’s TA for country i. (This expression also describes output by ﬁrm i
for its own national market.) By (2.8), the greater is d the smaller is the output produced
by a non-regional member of i’s TA for country i. Expressions (2.9) and (2.10) reﬂect the
same basic intuition.
2.3. Welfare
Proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms and tariﬀ revenues are rebated back to consumers. Also, there is
perfect competition in the world market for transportation. Based on these assumptions and
8the model set-up, country i’s welfare can be expressed in terms of four economic components:
domestic consumer surplus, Ci; tariﬀ revenue, Ti; shipping revenue, Di; the domestic ﬁrm’s
proﬁt at home and abroad, πii and
P
j∈N\i πji respectively (j 6= i)). Country i’s welfare is
denoted wi:




where Ci = 1
2 (e − pi)Xi, Ti =
P
j∈N tijxij and Di =
P
j∈N dijxij. Because the transport
sector is perfectly competitive, goods are delivered at cost and there is no surplus associated
with that sector; Di = 0. This speciﬁcation makes ‘iceberg’ transportation costs consistent
with the present general equilibrium setting.
The next result shows that (2.11) may be expressed strictly in terms of outputs.
Lemma 1. Country i’s welfare, wi, may be written as












This result is familiar from the past literature. Equation (2.12) incorporates transport
costs in an otherwise standard expression. Using (2.7)-(2.10), we can now express wi as a
function of tariﬀs and the regional structure of the model.
2.3.1. Optimal tariﬀs
The members of a TA coordinate on setting external tariﬀs. The problem of the representa-
























where tij = 0 for all i,j ∈ Bk. Using (2.13) we are now in a position to determine optimal
tariﬀs.
9Proposition 1. Assume that country i belongs to a TA of bir regional members and
binr non-regional members. Country i’s unique optimal external tariﬀ on imports from a




(1 + 2(bir + binr))(e − c)
∆(bir,binr)
+
3 + 6bir + binr (2(bir + binr) − 7)
2∆(bir,binr)
d,
where ∆(bir,binr) ≡ 7 + (1 + (bir + binr))(1 + 2(bir + binr)).
The unique optimal external tariﬀ imposed by country i on non-members who are not




(1 + 2(bir + binr))(e − c)
∆(bir,binr)
−
5 + bir (2bir − 3) + 2binr (5 + bir)
2∆(bir,binr)
d.
Note that if d = 0 then t∗
ir (bir,binr;d) = t∗
inr (bir,binr;d). On the other hand, if d > 0
then t∗
ir (bir,binr;d) − t∗
inr (bir,binr;d) is increasing in d > 0. Also notice that if d = 0 then
t∗
ir = t∗
inr corresponds exactly to the optimal tariﬀ found in previous literature.16
If countries are identical, as in Yi (1996), then the solution to (2.13) mandates that all
members of a TA set the same external (joint-welfare-maximizing) tariﬀ; they form a CU in
other words. Here in the present setting, when countries are not identical (i.e. when d > 0),
members have an incentive to set a tariﬀ that discriminates between non-members based on
their location. With equal tariﬀs, a ﬁrm would always export a larger volume to a nearby
country because less of its rents are dissipated in shipping; its export supply elasticity is
increasing in distance. This in turn motivates higher optimal tariﬀs on imports from the
same region than on imports from the other region; t∗
ir (bir,binr;d) > t∗
inr (bir,binr;d).17
The reason for adopting the derivation of optimal tariﬀs in Proposition 1 is for theo-
retical consistency with the past literature and in particular with our ‘benchmark approach’
taken by Yi (1996). However, the analytical approach taken in the present paper may be
16In Yi’s model, under the speciﬁcation of homogeneous products, his preference function replicates the
expression for ui in the present paper, (2.2). In the model of the present paper, if we let d = 0 and
k = bir+binr and e−c = 1 then t∗
ir = t∗
inr = (1 + 2k)/
 
8 + 3k + 2k2
. If we set n = 6 in Yi’s expression for
the optimal tariﬀ, presented in his Proposition 1, we obtain τ (k) = (1 + 2k)/
 
8 + 3k + 2k2
, where τ (k) is
Yi’s notation for the optimal tariﬀ and n is Yi’s notation for the number of countries.
17For example, consider a two-country TA with one country from each region; say these are countries 1
and 4. Then country 1 sets tariﬀs t12 = t13 = t∗
ir (1,1;d) > t15 = t16 = t∗
inr (1,1;d) and country 4 sets tariﬀs
t45 = t46 = t∗
ir (1,1;d) > t42 = t43 = t∗
inr (1,1;d).
10seen as unsatisfactory in practical terms because it does not require members of an agree-
ment to set a common external tariﬀ. The Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle of the
General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), adopted in the Charter of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), requires that all members of the WTO set the same tariﬀ on
each others’ imports. Article XXIV, which sets out the WTO rules on TA formation, deﬁnes
an exception to the MFN principle in that members may allow entry of imports from other
members at preferential rates. (Members must endeavor to remove tariﬀs completely on im-
ports from other members). Nevertheless, Article XXIV requires that the MFN principle for
non-members of the TA be upheld.18 Under our approach, the TA that we analyze violates
the MFN principle in that t∗
ir (bir,binr;d) > t∗
inr (bir,binr;d) when d > 0.
It is straight-forward to address this issue by adding an MFN tariﬀ constraint, tir = tinr,
to the tariﬀ problem set out in (2.13), thus implying that any TA that formed must be a CU.
The resulting MFN tariﬀ is a weighted average of t∗
ir (bir,binr;d) and t∗
inr (bir,binr;d), where
the weight depends on the values of bir and binr. The results that follow (Propositions 2, 3,
etc.) do not change qualitatively under the MFN tariﬀ constraint since what drives them is
the fact that larger rents may be shifted within a region by a given tariﬀ, not that the tariﬀ
on imports within a region is higher. However, since the common external tariﬀ is a weighted
average of the tariﬀs presented in Proposition 1, it is signiﬁcantly more cumbersome to work
with. So we will base the analysis on the discriminatory tariﬀs presented in Proposition 1.
Article XXIV also stipulates that members may not raise tariﬀs on non-members when
they form or expand a TA. It is straight-forward to check that t∗
ir (bir,binr;d) and t∗
inr (bir,binr;d)
are decreasing in agreement size, so Article XXIV is satisﬁed in this respect.19
18CU formation is consistent with MFN since, by deﬁnition of a CU, external tariﬀs must be common.
19The results of this paper also hold under the more analytically straightforward but less interesting
assumption that external tariﬀs are set at exogenously speciﬁed ‘MFN’ (i.e. common non-prohibitive) levels.
The underlying assumption would be that tariﬀs were pre-determined by multilateral tariﬀ reductions and
that TA formation were taking place in that context. In summary, the results of the present paper concerning
coordination on a regional agreement do not depend on the assumptions made regarding how external tariﬀs
are set providing members do not compete with each other for third markets. This latter possibility will be
discussed in due course.
112.4. Demand functions by region and TA membership
We can now use equilibrium tariﬀs t∗
ir (bir,binr;d) and t∗
inr (bir,binr;d) in (2.7)-(2.10) to write
down expressions for equilibrium outputs produced for country i:
xirm (bir,binr;d) =




2(1 + bir + binr)(e − c) − (5 + 2b2








2(e − c) − (5 + bir (3 + 2(bir + binr)))d
2∆(bir,binr)
. (2.17)
It can be seen by inspection that trade ﬂows are lowest between countries that are not
members of the same TA and are not in the same region; xinrnm (bir,binr) is the smallest of
the quantities given by (2.14)-(2.17).20 Also, by (2.17), xinrnm (bir,binr) is decreasing in d. It
follows that, by placing an upper bound on d, we can ensure that xinrnm (bir,binr) > 0 and
that in turn all trade ﬂows are positive. The next result identiﬁes the upper bound on d.21
Lemma 2. Fix e > c. If d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22) then, for bir ∈ {1,2,3}, binr ∈ {0,1,2,3} and
bir+binr ≤ 5 we have that xirm (bir,binr) > xinrm (bir,binr) > xirnm (bir,binr) > xinrnm (bir,binr) >
0 and t∗
ir (bir,binr) > t∗
inr (bir,binr) > 0.
To restrict attention to positive output levels and positive optimal tariﬀs, the following
standing assumption will be imposed throughout.
Assumption 1. d ∈ [0,(e − c)/22).
Thus, TA formation always entails the removal of positive tariﬀs.
20Henceforth, the parameter d will be dropped from functional notation so that, for example, tir(bir,binr;d)
will be written tir(bir,binr) and xinrnm (bir,binr;d) will be written xinrnm (bir,binr).
21The reason for restricting attention to bir + binr ≤ 5 in Lemma 2 is because there are no non-regional
non-members under free trade (bir = 3, binr = 3), and so it does not make sense to calculate a quantity for
xinrnm (3,3). Using bir + binr ≤ 6 instead would not aﬀect the results qualitatively.
122.5. TA Expansion and Welfare
In this subsection, we will look at the eﬀect of (exogenously speciﬁed) TA formation and
expansion on member and non-member welfare. We will follow Yi (1996) by looking ﬁrst at
the eﬀect of TA formation on non-member countries. Yi shows (in his Proposition 3) that
if a TA forms or expands, then non-member countries are adversely aﬀected. We will now
show that Yi’s result extends directly to the present model.
TA expansion may occur within a region (in which case bir increases) or across regions
(in which case binr increases). Thus, deﬁne TA expansion as an increase in bir and/or binr.22
TA formation is just a special case of TA expansion in which all members of the TA that
forms start as singletons.
Also note that TA expansion only aﬀects non-members through the demand for exports.
This is because optimal tariﬀ setting of non-members is unaﬀected by TA formation. Thus
we can evaluate the eﬀect of TA formation on non-members entirely in terms of the eﬀect
on non-member exports to the TA, xirnm and xinrnm, and hence export proﬁts.
Proposition 2. A non-member country’s volume of exports and export proﬁts to a TA of
size bir, binr is decreasing in bir and decreasing in binr. The expansion or formation of a TA
reduces the welfare of non-member countries.
As a TA expands, and removes internal trade barriers, demand for X by consumers
in member countries turns towards TA members and away from non-members, hurting the
export proﬁts of non-members. This result accords with Bond and Syropoulos (1996) in a
perfectly competitive framework and Yi (1996) in an oligopolistic framework.
Others have obtained the opposite result, that TA expansion beneﬁts outsiders; two key
examples are Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos (2004, a competitive framework) and Ornelas
(2005a, an oligopolistic framework). The key to this discrepancy lies in the fact that in
the present paper, as in Yi (1996), countries maximize welfare jointly when setting tariﬀs
while in Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos (2004) and in Ornelas (2005a) countries maximize
individual welfare while they agree to remove mutual tariﬀs. In other words, Bond and
22Say that a TA initially has two members, one in each region. Then say that one member breaks up with
its partner and instead forms a TA with two countries from its own region. Although a new larger TA is
created, this is not allowable under our deﬁnition of TA expansion since it involves cessation/contraction of
membership of the initial TA.
13Syropoulos (1996) and Yi (1996) study CUs while the latter two papers study FTAs. (Recall
from Section 2.3.1 that under the MFN constraint, the present model would generate CUs
as well.)
In an oligopolistic framework the discrepancy in outcomes can be attributed directly
to a diﬀerence in the way export proﬁts are treated by governments. Essentially the same
eﬀect operates in a competitive framework but cannot be attributed to ﬁrm proﬁts since in
that case the analysis is based on an endowment economy. A CU common external tariﬀ
maximizes the collective proﬁt of all CU member exports to the rest of the world. The same
feature is present in our model. In an FTA, by contrast, countries do not care about each
others’ export proﬁts and hence compete in tariﬀs for third markets. Thus, while tariﬀs in
the present model fall with TA expansion, they would fall more under FTA expansion, so
much so that trade ﬂows would increase not just between agreement members but between
non-members as well. Thus both types of TA formation tend to hinder the move to free trade:
for CU formation this is so because members gain at non-members’ expense and therefore
do not wish to see them join; for FTA formation this is because non-members free-ride on
the agreement, doing better by remaining outside it than by joining it. Our analysis will be
based on the former set of interactions.23
Let us now examine the eﬀect of TA formation on the welfare of members. Yi shows for
his model that the joint welfare of countries involved in TA expansion increases (where ‘joint’
implies the welfare of existing members and new members). And more generally, if several
TAs merge to form a larger TA the aggregate welfare of the member countries increases.
Yi remarks that consumer surplus displays a non-monotonicity that is present in underlying
optimal external tariﬀs; the consumer surplus in member countries may ﬁrst decrease and
then increase as a TA expands. A country’s export proﬁts, on the other hand, may initially
increase but ultimately decrease as the TA expands. The present model introduces a further
ambiguity because there are two common external tariﬀs; the one levied on countries in the
same region and the one levied on countries in the other region. Even though the economic
environment is made more complicated by the regional dimension of the model, the next
result shows that Yi’s Proposition 4 extends to the present setting as well.
23The latter set of interactions are beyond the scope of the present paper but it would be interesting to
study these in a regional setting in future research.
14Proposition 3. The expansion or formation of a TA increases the aggregate welfare of
member countries.
If a set of countries abolishes tariﬀs internally and sets external tariﬀs to maximize
aggregate welfare then their joint welfare must improve. Proposition 3 shows that the for-
mation of a TA improves joint welfare of member countries even if non-negative tariﬀs on
imports are the only policy tools and even though members and non-members may be in
diﬀerent regions.
So far, we have seen that Yi’s results concerning TA expansion in an environment
where all countries are identical extend to the present setting where countries may diﬀer by
regional location. When a TA expands, this increases the aggregate welfare of the countries
in the TA and harms countries that are not members of the TA. Therefore, just as in the
world where countries are identical, this implies that the eﬀect of TA expansion on global
welfare is ambiguous. The single case in which this ambiguity disappears is the case where
TA expansion goes all the way to the grand coalition, which is equivalent to world free
trade. Thus, Yi’s Proposition 5 carries over to the present setting and is reproduced here
for completeness.
Proposition 4. The eﬀects on global welfare of the formation or expansion of TAs are
ambiguous, except when the grand TA forms. World welfare is higher under the grand TA
(world free trade) than under any other TA structure.
All of Yi’s results that we have examined so far extend to the present setting. These
results have focused on the welfare eﬀects of TA expansion on non-members and on the
aggregate welfare of members.
Let us now focus explicitly on the welfare of individual member countries in the TA
formation process. In doing so, we will show that a key property of Yi’s identical-country
model fails to hold when transport costs are suﬃciently large but still in the range where
trade ﬂows between all countries are positive. Of course, Yi’s result continues to hold when
transport costs are suﬃciently small.
15Proposition 5. There exists a unique value d0 ∈ (0,(e − c)/22) such that for d ∈ [0,d0),
a country is better oﬀ in a (4-country) TA consisting of itself and all 3 countries in the
other region than in a (3-country) regional TA in its own region. For d ∈ [d0,(e − c)/22), a
country is better oﬀ in a (3-country) regional TA in its own region than in a (4-country) TA
consisting of itself and all 3 countries in the other region.
For d ∈ [0,d0) this result is consistent with Yi’s Proposition 8, which says that a member
of a TA becomes better oﬀ if it leaves its TA to join another TA of equal or larger size. But
for d ∈ [d0,(e − c)/22), our result says that a country is better oﬀ remaining in a 3-country
TA within its own region than it would be if it left its regional TA to form a 4-country TA
with all three countries in the other region.24
To understand the intuition behind this result, let us consider a member of a regional
TA (in its own region), and ask whether it could gain by joining a regional TA in the other
region. Say that country 1 is initially in a regional TA; 1 ∈ B1 = R1. And say that the
countries in the other region form another regional TA, B2 = R2. Country 1 considers
whether it could gain by leaving B1 to join B2. Decompose the process into three steps:
(i) Original members of B2 abolish tariﬀs on imports from country 1 and change tariﬀs
on the other countries in R1 from t∗
inr (3,0) to t∗
inr (3,1); (ii) Country 1 abolishes tariﬀs on
all countries in B2, and levies tariﬀs at t∗
ir (1,3) on its two former TA partners in B1; (iii)
The remaining two members of B1 change tariﬀs on the (original) members of B2 (who are
located in R2) from t∗
inr (3,0) to t∗
inr (2,0) and levy a tariﬀ t∗
ir (2,0) on country 1.
Consider the eﬀect of each of these steps on the welfare of country 1 for d ∈ [0,d0) and
d ∈ [d0,(e − c)/22) respectively. Take d ∈ [0,d0) ﬁrst. (i) The abolition of tariﬀs by the
members of B2 has a positive impact on the welfare of country 1, because country 1 enjoys
greater openness in three markets. (ii) country 1’s abolition of tariﬀs on all three countries
in B2 also improves welfare but the implementation of tariﬀs on its two former TA partners
in B1 reduces welfare; the net eﬀect is positive because access is increased to three markets
while it is reduced in only two. (iii) Finally, the implementation of tariﬀs by its two former
TA partners in B1 reduces export proﬁts and hence welfare in country 1. But the eﬀect on
exports of access to its three new partners in B2 (in step (i)) more than compensates. The
24We are assuming that if a country is just indiﬀerent between forming a regional agreement or a non-
regional agreement then it exhibits a preference for the regional agreement. This assumption is trivial, and
could be reversed without consequence.
16positive eﬀect on consumer surplus from net tariﬀ removal in moving to the larger TA is
greater than the negative eﬀect on tariﬀ revenue and the loss of domestic proﬁts from greater
competition in the domestic market.
Now take d ∈ [d0,(e − c)/22). The impact on welfare for country 1 of moving from B1
to B2 is reversed. (i) As before, the removal of tariﬀs by country 1’s three new partners
in B2 has a positive impact on export proﬁts. (ii) And once again, country 1’s abolition of
tariﬀs on all three countries in B2 improves welfare while the implementation of tariﬀs on
its two former TA partners in B1 reduces welfare. But in the presence of transport costs,
the net eﬀect is negative because the implementation of tariﬀs by two nearby partners has a
larger negative eﬀect on export proﬁts than the removal of tariﬀs by the three new distant
partners in the other region. (iii) Again, the implementation of tariﬀs by its two former TA
partners in B1 reduces export proﬁts and hence welfare in country 1. And now, the eﬀect on
exports of access to its three new partners in B2 (in step (i)) is not suﬃcient to compensate.
The positive eﬀect on consumer surplus from net tariﬀ removal in moving to the larger TA
is smaller than the negative eﬀect on tariﬀ revenue and the loss of domestic proﬁts from
greater competition in the domestic market.
Thus, a key result of Yi’s is overturned in the present model with the introduction of
transport costs. This is signiﬁcant because it shows that a country will not leave a TA in
its own region to form or join a TA in the other region, even if the new TA that forms
is larger. In Yi’s characterization of an equilibrium TA structure, based on the property
that a country would always leave a TA to join a larger one, the ﬁrst TA to form is always
the largest and the last is always the smallest. Proposition 5 therefore calls into question
whether, in a regional setting, the TAs that form in equilibrium are necessarily asymmetric
in size.
One is bound to ask whether the tendency towards regionalism presented in this result
is speciﬁc to the model we are using here. Interestingly, Egger and Larch (2006) show that
exactly the same eﬀect prevails in a generalization of Krugman’s (1991) constant-elasticity-
of-substitution model of regionalism. Egger and Larch (2006) have three regions, each of
which has two countries. They present simulations in Figure 4 of their paper to show that,
with relatively high intercontinental transport costs, a country would rather form a (two
country) regional TA than form a (three country) TA by joining a TA with two countries
17from another region. This suggests that the tendencies towards regionalism derived in the
present model extend to other settings as well.25
A natural question to ask next is whether the members of a regional TA would invite
a country from the other region to join them. The next result shows that, once again, the
answer depends on the size of transport costs.
Proposition 6. There exists a value d00 ∈ (d0,(e − c)/22) such that for d ∈ [0,d00) the
highest feasible level of welfare is achieved when a country is a member of a TA with all of
its regional partners and one country from the other region while non-members are singletons.
For d ∈ [d00,(e − c)/22), the highest feasible level of welfare is achieved when a country is a
member of a regional TA (with all members from its own region and no members from the
other region) while non-members are singletons.
This result is again in keeping with Yi (1996). A group of countries can obtain a
higher level of welfare than under free trade by forming a TA while non-members remain
as singletons. In Yi’s model (with six countries and homogenous goods) the highest level of
welfare is achieved by a country when it forms a TA of four members. This continues to be
true in our model for d ∈ [0,d00), i.e. when transport costs are small. When transport costs
are larger, i.e. for d ∈ [d00,(e − c)/22), a country does better by forming a regional TA (only
with members from its own region). The reason is that the terms-of-trade beneﬁts of TA
formation increase with transport costs, and these beneﬁts are increasing in the number of
countries left outside the TA. In either case, to maximize national welfare, the TA of which
a country is a member must include all of its regional partners.
We are now in a position to see why it would not have been an option for us to adopt
Yi’s approach of using Bloch’s (1996) ‘size announcement’ game to model TA formation in
the present regional setting.26 The application of that game to the present framework would
be the following. All countries are placed on a list, say 1, 2, ... , 6. Country 1 would be
asked to announce the size of the agreement that it would like to form. Then, all proposed
partners (following subsequently from country 1) would be asked to agree or disagree. If a
proposed partner disagrees then it is asked to make its own proposal of a TA and, again,
25Egger and Larch (2006) identify these eﬀects to make sense of their empirical investigation of tendencies
towards regional TAs.
26See Bloch (1996) for further discussion of equilibrium existence issues when players are not identical.
18each subsequent proposed partner is asked whether or not it agrees. If all agree then those
countries withdraw from the game, and the next country on the list is asked to announce
the size of the TA that it wants to form. If the end of the list of countries is reached then
there is a return to the ﬁrst country on the list that has not already formed an agreement
and withdrawn from the game.
Now consider what would happen if the size announcement game were played based on
our model for d ∈ [0,d00). By Proposition 6, country 1 would announce that it wants to form
a 4-country TA consisting of itself and countries 2, 3 and 4. But, by Proposition 5, country
4 would do better in a TA with all of its regional partners so it refuses (while countries 2
and 3 accept). When country 4 is asked to make an alternative proposal, by Proposition 6,
it proposes a TA consisting of itself and countries 5, 6 and 1. This is a mirror of country
1’s original proposal. It is now clear that no equilibrium would exist in this situation.27 In
addition to providing a way to capture the coordination problem in TA formation, the TA
formation game presented in the next section also provides a way around this equilibrium
existence issue.
3. The TA Formation Game
As argued in the Introduction, a country has many potential options for partners when
seeking a TA, and this creates potential for coordination failure. We will capture this problem
formally by basing the TA formation process on the δ-game of Hart and Kurz (1983). We
will now set out the salient features of the TA formation game and how these reﬂect aspects
of the TA formation process that we want to focus on.
Hart and Kurz (1983) consider four simple coalition formation games, denoted by α, β,
γ and δ. The common element in all of these games is the selection procedure by which each
and every player simultaneously and without communicating writes down a list of the other
players with whom she would like to form a coalition. After the players have completed
the selection procedure, they are able to observe the membership of the coalitions that
will potentially form. The diﬀerence between the four games is the notion of stability; the
description of what happens if one or more player wishes to leave the proposed coalition
27For d ∈ [d00,(e − c)/22), an equilibrium does exist for the size announcement game in which two regional
TAs form, one in each region.
19having observed the potential membership. For our purposes, an appealing feature of the
δ-game is that if, having learned the identity of coalition members, any player wishes to leave
a coalition she can do so while the coalition otherwise remains in tact.28 This captures a
feature of TA formation, which seems to reﬂect actual practice, that if one proposed partner
chooses not to go ahead with the TA then the others may still do so.29
A second feature of actual coalition formation that we will capture here is that coun-
tries who approach each other to form a TA have more information about the prospective
membership of their agreement than countries who have not approached each other. In the
TA formation game, we will adopt a particularly tractable form of this assumption; within
a period, each country only ﬁnds out about the prospective TA membership of its own TA
partners. We adopt this approach from Arnold and Wooders (2005), who introduce this
informational friction in their formalization of club formation.30
This assumption replaces the assumption made by Hart and Kurz (1983) that each
country has the same information about the coalition formation activities of all others. In
an abstract setting the approach of Hart and Kurz is undoubtedly more appealing. Yet
in the present applied setting our assumption seems to capture an important aspect of the
informational frictions that are likely to slow down the actual process of TA formation.31
In formal terms, the informational friction serves to introduce a degree of stability and
consequently enlarges the set of possible equilibria. After we have shown that the set of
equilibria is potentially large, we will then show how the introduction of a second friction,
that of transport costs, reduces the number of equilibria to one.
The game lasts three periods; t = 0, 1, 2. The process is initialized at t = 0 with a TA
structure in which there are no TAs; initially the TA structure, B, is the set of singletons.
28In the γ-game, by contrasting example, all players in a proposed coalition return to singleton status if
one player leaves. The α-game and β-game embody similar variations in coalition stability.
29For example, even though Britain dropped out of the original discussions to form the European Economic
Community (which later became the EU) the original signatories to the Treaty of Rome still went ahead in
1957.
30Arnold and Wooders (2005) use the word ‘club’ in the same sense as Hart and Kurz (1983) use the word
‘coalition’. Both concepts correspond to the notion of TA as we use it here.
31Even if a country can deduce that it is in the national interests of another group of countries to form
a TA in response to its own TA formation activities, the assumption will be that it does not act on the
deduction; it waits to respond until that TA has actually been observed to form. An interpretation of this
assumption is that countries attach a degree of ‘political uncertainty’ to the TA-formation process due to
possible distributional or politically-motivated concerns of policy-makers which cannot be observed from
outside the country.
20Within each period t ≥ 1, the sequence of events is as follows. At the start of the period,
each country observes the TA structure of the previous period. Then, each country i chooses
a strategy, si, where each si contains a list of countries in N with which country i would
like to form a TA; this list includes country i itself.32 The strategy space, Si, for country
i is the set of all subsets of N, i.e. the set of all possible TAs that could include country
i. Strategies are chosen simultaneously. During the TA formation process, a country only
observes whether or not it ends up in a TA and, if so, it sees which other countries are its
TA partners. A country does not observe the strategies of other countries. We will say that,
during the TA formation process, if a country does not observe another country as its TA
partner, it maintains the assumption that the trade policy of that other country is described
by the TA structure B of the previous period.
A bilateral trade accord (i,j) is formed if and only if i ∈ sj and j ∈ si. A subset of
countries Bk is a TA if and only if all pairs of countries in Bk have a bilateral trade accord.
This assumption ensures that a TA forms if and only if there is unanimous support for
its membership. If a country ﬁnds itself in the position of being in two or more otherwise
exclusive and otherwise unanimous TAs, it chooses the TA that maximizes its payoﬀ under
the assumption that the memberships of the TA that it joins and the TA that it leaves
remain otherwise constant.33 When a country chooses one TA over another one, it assumes
that the other goes ahead without it. In order for a new TA to form by the merger of more
than one existing TA, all members of all merging TAs must agree to the new one.
Under the assumption that countries observe the TA structure given by B in the previous
period and take this as given, it is not possible to break up an existing TA in the process of
forming a new one. Therefore, the assumption introduces a degree of inertia into the formal
characterization of existing TAs. Countries are unable to force out existing TA partners once
a TA has formed. In one sense, like the assumption that countries only observe their own TA
membership during the TA formation process, this is theoretically restrictive. But again the
32The purpose of including i in si is that then we can view Bk as the intersecting set of all the elements
of strategies si for all i ∈ N.
33Pushing this one step further, any two countries caught between two TAs will assume that each behaves
in the same way as the other in the TA that they choose. This assumption is the same as that of Hart
and Kurz, that if any player is caught between two coalitions then it chooses the biggest one under the
assumption that all other players caught in the same situation do the same. In a world where all countries
are identical this assumption is innocuous. In principle this assumption could lead to mistakes in a world
where countries diﬀer but this potential problem will not be an issue for any of the situations that we will
study.
21assumption seems reasonably realistic, in that it reﬂects actual practical restrictions on the
cessation arrangements of existing TAs. For example, with regard to the EU, any member
of the Council of Ministers has the power to veto membership of a country that would like
to join, but there is no way to force out a country that is already a member. The present
formalization reﬂects exactly this type of arrangement.
Each strategy vector s = (s1,...,sN) induces a unique TA structure, B, and so we can
now write B as a function of s; B (s):
B (s) = {(i,j)|i ∈ sj,j ∈ si}.
Since a TA structure implies a unique value of bir and binr for each country i, and since these
in turn imply values of t∗
ir (bir,binr) and t∗
inr (bir,binr), the payoﬀ to country i associated with
s can be represented simply as wi = wi (tir (B (s)),tinr (B (s))); the payoﬀ for country i from
the TA structure induced by s. For compactness, we may write wi = wi (s).
The notion of equilibrium is adapted from Arnold and Wooders (2005). For any given
TA structure B = (B1,...,Bk,...,Bm), a strategy vector s∗ ∈ S is a Nash club equilibrium of
the TA formation game if for any given Bk ∈ B there is no Z ⊆ Bk and s ∈ S such that
1. si = s∗
i for all i / ∈ Z.
2. wi (s) ≥ wi (s∗) for all i ∈ Z and wi (s) > wi (s∗) for some i ∈ Z.
By deﬁnition, an equilibrium exists if no group of countries Z in some TA, Bk, can do
better by deviating. In formal terms the diﬀerence between our assumption and that of Hart
and Kurz may be understood as follows. Hart and Kurz allow deviations to be undertaken
by any coalition Z ⊆ N (in contrast to our restriction of deviations to Z ⊆ Bk). Thus,
our deﬁnition weakens the notion of equilibrium relative to Hart and Kurz, admitting a
relatively large number of equilibria. In particular, it does not exclude from the equilibrium
set candidates that arise as a result of coordination failure - in the present context, where
countries could all beneﬁt by merging their proposed TAs but fail to do so due to the
informational friction. It remains to be shown how the problem of coordination arises when
all countries are identical and is resolved when countries may diﬀer by region.
224. The Problem of Coordination Failure
We will now show how the problem of coordination arises in a world where all countries are
identical. To do so, we will ﬁx d = 0. By Proposition 6, we know that a TA of four countries
maximizes the welfare of its members (if the other two countries are singletons). The problem
of coordination failure arises because, even if each country writes down a strategy si with
four elements, in the absence of communication there are many possible TA structures that
may arise in equilibrium as a result of all countries playing this strategy. An equilibrium may
arise in which there is a TA with four countries, which is the desired outcome of each of the
members. But of course the two countries excluded from the four-country TA do not achieve
their desired outcome. Moreover, this is not the only TA structure that can be sustained
in equilibrium. We will ﬁrst consider an equilibrium in which there is a four-country TA,
but then consider one of many possible alternative TA structures that may arise when all
countries seek to form a TA with four members.
4.1. Various equilibria with coordination failure
An example of a strategy vector, s, that gives rise to an equilibrium in which there is a
four-country TA is as follows:
s1 = s2 = s3 = s4 = {1,2,3,4}, s5 = s6 = {1,2,5,6}.
Notice that the strategies s1...s4 form an intersecting set of elements {1,2,3,4} while 5 is
only listed in s6 (and s5 of course) and 6 is only listed in s5 (and s6). Thus, the result-
ing trade agreement structure is {{1,2,3,4},{5,6}}. It is easy to check that no country
can gain by deviating from this agreement structure and so therefore this must be an equi-
librium. Consider the allowable deviations. If a member of the four-country TA were to
veto membership of another single member then the TA structure would become one of a
three-country TA, a singleton and a two-country TA, for example {{1,2,3},{4},{5,6}}.
Then, since welfare is maximized in a TA of four countries, the payoﬀ to the country that
undertook the veto would fall, as would the payoﬀ of the ejected member. The welfare of
5 and 6 actually increases. If more than one country’s membership is vetoed, it is easy to
check that the payoﬀ of remaining members falls even further. Therefore, no member of the
four-country TA has an incentive to deviate. The same is true for the two-country TA. Thus
23we have a Nash club equilibrium.
We have already discussed above the reasons why TA member welfare changes when one
or more countries are ejected. Let us brieﬂy review why non-member welfare changes. We
just noted that, from an initial trade agreement structure of {{1,2,3,4},{5,6}}, if country
4 is ejected, leaving a trade agreement structure of {{1,2,3},{4},{5,6}}, then the welfare
of 5 and 6 increases. Why does this happen? Tariﬀs set by 5 and 6 do not change because
these depend only on their own TA structure, which has not changed. When 4 is ejected,
countries 1, 2 and 3 restore tariﬀs against it, and as a result demand less of X from 4, shifting
some of their demand towards 5 and 6. With all else equal, this puts the trade accounts of
countries 5 and 6 into surplus, requiring an improvement in their terms-of-trade to restore
equilibrium. This adjustment occurs within the model via an increase in the ﬂow of proﬁts
to the ﬁrms in 5 and 6. In addition, 4 restores tariﬀs against countries 1, 2 and 3, shifting
its demand for X towards 5 and 6. Both of these eﬀects combine to shift proﬁts towards 5
and 6, thus increasing welfare.
Notice that, because d = 0, the partition of countries into regions has no relevance to
this equilibrium. As speciﬁed, the equilibrium contains three countries from R1 and one
country from R2. But under an equivalent characterization of equilibrium we could have
permuted the countries in such a way that two countries were in R1 (say 1 and 2), and two
countries were in R2 (say 3 and 4). This is due to the fact that all countries are identical.
We shall see that the partition of countries into regions does become relevant for equilibrium
when d > 0.
Now let us consider another possible equilibrium in which there are three TAs, each with
two members. This equilibrium arises if each country proposes to form a four-member-TA







24By inspection of the strategy vector, the agreements that form are {1,4}, {2,5} and
{3,6}. Again, it is straight-forward to check that this is an equilibrium strategy vector.
If any member of a two-country agreement vetoes membership of the other, splitting the
agreement into two singletons, then its payoﬀ falls by (the reverse of) Proposition 3. This is
the only feasible deviation.
5. Transport Costs and Coordination
The problem of coordination failure identiﬁed in the previous section is resolved in the
presence of a transport cost d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22). Note that the transport cost may be
arbitrarily small.
Proposition 7. Assume d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22). At t = 1 there is a unique equilibrium with
two regional TAs; B1 = R1, B2 = R2. The payoﬀ to each country is the same and is lower
than free trade.
There are two cases to consider, although the outcome is the same in both; one where
d ∈ (0,d00) and one where d ∈ [d00,(e − c)/22). The second case is easier so we consider
that ﬁrst. By Proposition 6, due to higher transport costs d ∈ [d00,(e − c)/22), each country
anticipates obtaining the highest level of welfare from a regional TA with only the two other
countries in its own region. Thus, it is immediate that the intersecting sets formed by
countries’ strategies is two regional TAs; B1 = R1 and B2 = R2.
The case where d ∈ (0,d00) is slightly more subtle. In that case, each country’s welfare is
maximized by a 4-member TA with three members from its own region and one member from
the other region. But even if all countries write down a strategy containing four countries,
three from its own region and one from the other region, the intersecting sets of countries
formed by these strategies give rise to two regional TAs; B1 = R1 and B2 = R2. To see why,
consider the following strategy vector:
s1 = s2 = s3 = {1,2,3,4}, s4 = s5 = s6 = {1,4,5,6}.
The strategies s1...s3 form an intersecting set of elements {1,2,3} and the strategies s4...s6
form an intersecting set of elements {4,5,6}. Thus, {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}} is the resulting TA
structure. Even though, for this example, all countries that end up in B1 list country 4,
25country 4 only names country 1 and not 2 and 3. Only the membership of 1, 2 and 3 is
unanimous among all members. It is straight forward to check that the same is true for all
other possible strategy vectors.
No country can gain by deviating from this agreement structure and so therefore this
must be an equilibrium. Consider the allowable deviations. If a member of one of the regional
agreements were to veto membership of another single member then the agreement structure
would become one of a two-country agreement, a singleton and a three-country agreement;
for example {{1,2,3},{4,5},{6}}. Then the payoﬀ to the country that undertook the
veto, in this example country 4 or 5, would fall. The welfare of countries in the regional
trade agreement that remains, {1,2,3}, increases. As before, if more than one country’s
membership is vetoed, it is easy to check that the payoﬀ of the remaining member falls even
further. Thus, no member of a regional agreement has an incentive to deviate. No deviation
is available to the singleton. Thus we have a Nash club equilibrium. This is the only
possible equilibrium that can arise for transport costs in the interval d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22)). In
equilibrium the TA structure is symmetrical, so each country receives the same payoﬀ. By
Proposition 4, the payoﬀ that each country receives must be lower than under free trade.
Clearly, the informational friction is necessary for this outcome. If countries had com-
plete information about each other and were far-sighted then each would anticipate that the
countries of the other region would form a TA as well. Then each country would be able to
see that a move to free trade would be more beneﬁcial. But we can also see how the present
assumption regarding informational frictions captures aspects of uncertainty that are likely
to be present in the actual process of TA formation across regions.
6. Do Regional TAs Facilitate Free Trade?
We have seen how, for d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22), two regional TAs emerge at stage t = 1. We now
proceed to stage t = 2 and ask whether free trade can emerge at this point. We ﬁnd that it
does. The thinking is as follows. At the beginning of period t = 2, each country observes
the TA structure described by B from period t = 1, at which point there were two regional
trade agreements; B1 = R1, B2 = R2. Countries would be able to secure the same payoﬀ at
t = 2 as at t = 1 by maintaining the existing TA structure. However, each is able to obtain
a higher payoﬀ by moving to free trade. (In the next result, the reference to t = 1 replicates
26Proposition 1 and is included for completeness.)
Proposition 8. Assume d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22). There is a unique equilibrium path. At t = 1
there are two regional TAs; B1 = R1, B2 = R2. At t = 2 there is world free trade.
How can free trade be an equilibrium at t = 2 but not at t = 1? At t = 1, from free
trade, by Proposition 6 a country has an incentive to veto the membership of two or three
countries from the other region (depending on whether d ∈ (0,d0) or d ∈ [d0,(e − c)/22)).
Each country operates under the assumption that the countries whose memberships were
vetoed would return to singleton status since that was their status in the network B at t = 0.
At t = 2 the outcome is diﬀerent. All excluded countries return to the TA structure given
by B at t = 1; {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}}. By Proposition 7, the payoﬀ to such a deviation is not
proﬁtable as it is lower than free trade. Thus, we have shown that free trade is a Nash club
equilibrium at t = 2. Regional trade agreements do ultimately facilitate free trade in this
setting.
7. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to show that problems of coordination failure in the
formation of TAs may be resolved when countries are organized into regions. Costs of
shipping goods between regions must be signiﬁcant, but not so high as to eliminate trade
between regions. With no transport costs, there is a problem of multiple equilibria due to
coordination failure familiar from the theory of coalition formation. Positive transport costs
are enough to bring about a unique equilibrium in the ﬁrst period of the TA formation
game. Starting from a situation where there are no TAs, in the ﬁrst period two regional TAs
form simultaneously. In the second period the two regional TAs merge to bring about free
trade. The attainment of free trade only after a period of regionalism rests on a friction in
the ﬂow of information through the TA formation process and on uncertainty about the TA
formation activities taking place beyond the boundaries of each agreement. Members can
only communicate about their agreement once they have simultaneously and independently
chosen their TA partners.
Inevitably, the theoretical framework developed here simpliﬁes the situation in a number
of key respects. The underlying economic structure of the model is one of Cournot competi-
27tion in a homogeneous product. In practice, the forces of competition are understood to be
more subtle and complex. Future research could take steps to see the extent to which the in-
sights of the present model extend to alternative settings. It seems reasonable to argue that
the features of our model which drive regional TA formation would extend to other forms of
competition. In particular, it is widely appreciated that Bertrand competition behaves like
Cournot competition when ﬁrms must pre-commit to quantities. A more elaborate modeling
of perfect competition should also exhibit the same features, as suggested by Bond (2001).
The key motivating feature of the model is that, in the absence of an agreement, there would
be greater rent shifting within a region than across regions. This feature of the model is
motivated by the presence of transport costs and will be robust to alternative assumptions
about competition between ﬁrms and tariﬀ setting between governments.
It also seems reasonable to argue that the features of the model would extend to a
more elaborate model of production. A direct way to make such an extension would be to
assume that X is horizontally diﬀerentiated, extending preferences and production accord-
ingly. Alternatively, Syropoulos (2002) oﬀers a way to investigate whether the insights of
the regional model developed in the present paper could be extended to a Heckscher-Ohlin
framework. This would take explicit account of how diﬀerences in factor endowments would
interact with countries’ organization into geographical regions. Syropoulos also oﬀers a way
to consider whether there is an incentive to delegate trade policy setting to a country that
is deemed to have more tariﬀ-setting power due to its geographical location, because it is
closer to non-members for example.
A question that arises through our analysis is how the results would be aﬀected by
the trade regime. Our results are based on the assumption that countries coordinate on
the setting of external tariﬀs as in a CU (except that TAs do not necessarily set common
external tariﬀs in our framework). Outcomes might look diﬀerent if countries were to form
FTAs instead. In real life it is CUs that appear most often to be regional, the most prominent
examples being the EU, MERCOSUR and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
All are formed between countries that have contiguous borders. On the other hand, the
recent proliferation of FTAs has included countries which are not close to each other, such
as the aforementioned FTA between South Korea and the US. This seems to suggest that
the forces towards regionalism may operate more forcefully in CUs than in FTAs. This in
turn begs the question of what drives the choice of trade regime; the question addressed by
28Riezman (1999). Thus Riezman presents an approach which could be used to address the
question of which trade regime would be adopted within the present regional framework,
and if an FTA were adopted whether it would necessarily be regional.
One question that should be addressed in future research on this topic is whether the
model predictions are robust to more elaborate country models and more realistic regional
structures. How big must the asymmetries across regions get before problems of multi-
ple equilibria re-emerge? How big must the asymmetry be in the numbers of ﬁrms across
countries before the result that countries prefer a regional-only agreement breaks down even
when transport costs are large? When will the presence of asymmetries preclude the eventual
move to free trade? Here Ornelas (2005b) might be helpful. Our model could be combined
quite naturally with his to examine the way that asymmetries aﬀect the regional outcomes
that we have demonstrated in the present model. An alternative way forward would be to
extend the framework of the present paper to incorporate more sophisticated and realistic
simulations-based models of the kind developed by Whalley (1985).
A focus of some research on regionalism is on situations where tariﬀs are used for political
or redistributive purposes.34 Such considerations could be incorporated in the model of the
present paper by putting a heavier weight on producers’ proﬁts. It seems possible that
producer interests which span regions, as between the UK and the US for example, could
counteract the forces towards regionalism identiﬁed in the basic framework.
Another interesting line of research would be to investigate how variation in the assump-
tions over informational frictions between countries through the agreement formation process
changes the outcome. It appears that perfect information and perfect foresight facilitate an
immediate move to free trade. But it would be interesting to ask in which ways weakening
information ﬂows would vary the outcome away from free trade, and under what alternative
assumptions about information ﬂows and expectations regional trade block formation would
be the result.
34In addition to Krishna (1998) and Ornelas (2005a,b), see for examples Grossman and Helpman (1995)
and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998).
29A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The basic proof strategy was suggested by Monika Mrazova for a
diﬀerent model in Mrazova, Vines and Zissimos (2007). First note that πij = (xij)
2 and
πji = (xji)
2; by (2.5) we have πij ≡ (pi − cij)xij and by the ﬁrst order condition of (2.5) we
have that pi − cij = xij.
Next, the ﬁrst four terms of (2.11) may be written



















where we have used the fact that Di = 0 by assumption and line 3 uses (2.3). On the other
hand, the ﬁrst four terms of (2.12) may be written







































































































where the second line uses (2.2), the fourth line uses (2.4) and the ﬁrst order condition of
(2.5), and the seventh line uses (2.3). The result follows. 
30Proof of Proposition 1.
Government i ’s problem, as expressed in (2.13), simpliﬁes to
Max
{tir,tinr}i∈Bk




− (3 − bir)(xirnm)
2 − (3 − binr)(xinrnm)
2
− d(binrxinrm + (3 − binr)xinrnm).
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to tir is
(e − c − 1)
dXi
dtir
− 2(3 − bir)xirnm
dxirnm
dtir













The ﬁrst order condition with respect to tinr is
(e − c − 1)
dXi
dtinr
− 2(3 − bir)xirnm
dxirnm
dtinr













Using (2.7)-(2.10) and their ﬁrst derivatives, a reduced form for each of the above ﬁrst order
conditions may be obtained. Since the objective function is globally concave in tir and in




(e − c)(1 + bir + binr) + (24 + 6bir − 8binr)d + (3 − binr)(15 + 2(bir + binr))tinr
2 + 2b2





(e − c)(1 + bir + binr) − (25 − 6bir + 8binr)d + (3 − binr)(15 + 2(bir + binr))tir
2 + 2b2
inr + binr (9 + 2bir) + 3(17 − 2bir)
.
Solving simultaneously for t∗
ir and t∗
inr obtains the result. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The fact that xirm (bir,binr) > xinrm (bir,binr) > xirnm (bir,binr) >
xinrnm (bir,binr) is established by inspection of (2.7)-(2.10). It remains to show that if
d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22) then xinrnm (bir,binr) > 0. Since xinrnm (bir,binr), as given by (2.10),
is decreasing d, we can solve for the largest value of d at which xinrnm (bir,binr) = 0 (for
bir ∈ {1,2,3}, binr ∈ {0,1,2,3} and bir + binr ≤ 5). The solution for the value of d at which
xinrnm (bir,binr) = 0, denoted by e d, is
e d =
2(e − c)
5 + 3bir + 2birbinr + 2b2
ir
.
31The solution e d is globally decreasing in bir and binr, so use bir = 3, binr = 2 in the solution to
yield e d = (e − c)/22. It can be checked by substitution that xinrnm (bir,binr) > 0 for bir = 2,
binr = 3. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2. It must be established that dxirnm/dbir < 0, dxinrnm/dbir < 0,
dxirnm/dbinr < 0, and dxinrnm/dbinr < 0 over the range of feasible bir and binr. Each case











2(3 + 4(bir + binr))(e − c) + (9 + 12bir + binr (1 + 2(bir + binr))(5 + 2(bir + binr)))d
2(∆(bir,binr))
2 .
So dxirnm (bir,binr)/dbir < 0 for all d ≥ 0.




(3 + 4bir + 2binr)d
2∆(bir,binr)
−




2(3 + 4(bir + binr))(e − c) + (9 + 12bir + binr (1 + 2(bir + binr))(5 + 2(bir + binr)))d
2(∆(bir,binr))
2 .
So dxinrnm (bir,binr)/dbir < 0 for all d ≥ 0. (After simpliﬁcation, we see that
dxirnm (bir,binr)/dbir = dxinrnm (bir,binr)/dbir.)




(3 + 2bir + 4binr)d
2∆(bir,binr)
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The second term in the numerator is positive and increasing in bir, binr and d while the
ﬁrst term is negative. It is easily checked that overall the numerator is negative for bir = 3,
32binr = 2 and d = (e − c)/22. So dxirnm (bir,binr)/dbinr < 0 for all feasible {bir,binr} pairs
and d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22).
















After simpliﬁcation, we see that dxinrnm (bir,binr)/dbinr = dxirnm (bir,binr)/dbinr So it must
be the case that dxinrnm (bir,binr)/dbinr < 0 for all feasible {bir,binr} pairs and d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22).

Proof of Proposition 3. The strategy of proof follows Yi (1996). Assume that there exists
a TA structure B = (B1,B2,...,Bm) and that two or more TAs, say B1, B2 ... Br, merge to
create an enlarged TA. We will show that the total welfare of the members of the enlarged
TA increases. To do this, we will show that the tariﬀ changes required to implement TA
enlargement undertaken by any one given member of the enlarged TA must increase the
aggregate welfare of all members. Thinking of TA enlargement as a sequence of such tariﬀ
changes by each and every member then gives the result.
Claim. Initially, before the merger, country i has free trade with bir − 1 countries in
its own region and binr countries in the other region. Country i levies a tariﬀ tir (bir,binr)
on each of the 3 − bir non-members in its own region and a tariﬀ tinr (bir,binr) on each of
the 3 − binr countries in the other region. As a result of the merger, in the new enlarged
TA, country i shares a TA with b0
ir − 1 countries in its own region and b0
inr countries in the
other region. Let hir = b0
ir − bir ≥ 0 and hinr = b0
inr − binr ≥ 0. Country i abolishes tariﬀs




inr) on each of the 3 − b0




inr) on each of the 3 − b0
inr non-members in the other region. Then the aggregate
welfare of the bir + hir + binr + hinr countries in the enlarged TA (which consists of country
i, bir + binr − 1 countries who paid no tariﬀs initially and hir + hinr countries whose tariﬀs
were abolished) improves.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the TA B1, of which country 1 is assumed to
33be a member. B1 has b1r members from R1 and b1nr members from R2. Then let membership
expand to create an enlarged TA, B0
1, consisting of b0
1r members in R1 and b0
1nr members
in R2 (where all original members are also members of the enlarged TA). The comparative
statics exercise that we will now carry out is as follows. We will calculate the eﬀect on the
aggregate welfare of all countries in B0
1 that results when country 1 abolishes tariﬀs on h1r
countries in R1 and h1nr countries in R2, and changes tariﬀs on (3 − b1r − h1r) non-members
in R1 from t1r (b1r,b1nr) to t1r (b0
1r,b0
1nr) and on (3 − b1nr − h1nr) non-members in R2 from














First consider inﬁnitesimal changes in tariﬀs
dt ≡(0,...,0,dt,...,dt,dtr,...,dtr,0,...,0,φdt,...,φdt,dtnr,...,dtnr)
from a tariﬀ vector
t ≡(0,...,0,t,...,t,tr,...,tr,0,...,0,φt,...,φt,tnr,...,tnr),
where: dt appears from the (b1r + 1)th element to the (b1r + h1r)th element; φdt appears from
the (b1nr + 4)th element to the (b1nr + h1nr + 3)th element, unless b1nr = h1nr = 0 in which
case dtnr appears from the 4th to the last element; dtr appears from the (b1r + h1r + 1)th
element to the 3rd element; dtnr appears from the (b1nr + h1nr + 4)th element to the last
element. The tariﬀ t was already being imposed on new TA members in the same region and
is reduced to zero through the TA formation process. The tariﬀ φt (i.e. φ × t) was already
being imposed on new TA members from the other region, where φ = t1nr/t1r (see below for































34where 0 appears from the ﬁrst to the (b1r + h1r)th element and from the fourth to the
(b1nr + h1nr + 3)th element (unless b1nr = h1nr = 0). We can move to
t(b1r,b1nr) ≡ (0,...,0,t1r (b1r,b1nr),...,t1r (b1r,b1nr),0,...,0,t1nr (b1r,b1nr),...,t1nr (b1r,b1nr))
where 0 appears from the ﬁrst to the (b1r)th element and from the fourth to the (b1nr + 4)th
element (unless b1nr = 0) by integrating the inﬁnitesimal changes dt from 0 to t(b1r,b1nr).





/dt < 0 for all t along such a path of integration.
The claim then follows.












































2(4 + 5b1nr + 2(b1nr − 1)b1r + 2b2
1r)d
(1 + 2(b1r + b1nr))(e − c) + (3 + b1r (2(b1r + b1nr) − 1))d
.





t1j = (h1r + φh1nr)t + (3 − b1r − h1r)tr + (3 − b1nr − h1nr)tnr.
The change in the total tariﬀ is calculated from dt as follows:
dT1 = (h1r + φh1nr)dt + (3 − b1r − h1r)dtr + (3 − b1nr − h1nr)dtnr
=
h1rt1r (b1r,b1nr) + h1nrt1nr (b1r,b1nr) + (3 − b1r − h1r)∆t1r + (3 − b1nr − h1nr)∆t1nr
t1r (b1r,b1nr)
dt.
35The following notation will also be helpful:
∆T1 = h1rt1r (b1r,b1nr) + h1nrt1nr (b1r,b1nr) + (3 − b1r − h1r)∆t1r + (3 − b1nr − h1nr)∆t1nr.
From (2.4) and the ﬁrst-order-condition of (2.5), we have pi − c = xij + tij + dij.
From (2.6), dxij =
dTi−7dtij

















































































{h1rt1r (b1r,b1nr)Ξ1 + h1nrt1nr (b1r,b1nr)Φ1
+(3 − b1r − h1r)∆t1rΨ1 + (3 − b1nr − h1nr)∆t1nrΩ1},
where:
Ξ1 = (X1 + T1) − 7(x1b1r+1 + t)
−2(3 − b1r − h1r)x1b1r+h1r+1 − 2(3 − b1nr − h1nr)x1b1nr+h1nr+4;
Φ1 = (X1 + T1) − 7(x1b1nr+4 + φt)
−2(3 − b1r − h1r)x1b1r+h1r+1 − 2(3 − b1nr − h1nr)x1b1nr+h1nr+4;
Ψ1 = (X1 + T1) − 7(x1b1r+h1r+1 + tr) + 2(4 + b1r + h1r)x1b1r+h1r+1;
Ω1 = (X1 + T1) − 7(x1b1nr+h1nr+4 + tnr) + 2(4 + b1nr + h1nr)x1b1nr+h1nr+4.








< 0 proceeds in two steps. First we show that,
at t(b0
1r,b0


















36Step 1. At t(b0
1r,b0
1nr), the optimal tariﬀs t1r (b0
1r,b0
1nr) and t1nr (b0
1r,b0
1nr) are chosen




1\{1} πij with respect to t1r and t1nr respectively; t1r (b0
1r,b0
1nr) and t1nr (b0
1r,b0
1nr)
are the optimal tariﬀs of the size b0
1r +b0
1nr TA on 3−b0
1r regional non-members and 3−b1nr
non-regional non-members respectively, given free trade among the b0
1r + b0
1nr members.) It
remains to show that, at t(b0
1r,b0
1nr), the terms Ξ1 and Φ1 are both strictly negative. (Of




1nr), x11 =,...,= x1b1r+h1r, x14 =,...,x1b1nr+h1nr+3 (unless b1nr = h1nr = 0, in
which case x14 =,...,x1b1nr+h1nr+4), and t = 0. Also,
X1 = b
0




1nrx1b1nr+h1nr+3 + (3 − b
0
1nr)x1b1nr+h1nr+4;































Now, observing that x11 = x1rm, x1b1r+h1r+1 = x1rnm, x1b1nr+h1nr+3 = x1nrm and x1b1nr+h1nr+4 =
x1nrnm, we can use (2.7)-(2.10) to substitute for x11, x1b1r+h1r+1, x1b1nr+h1nr+3 and x1b1nr+h1nr+4,
which obtains
Ξ1 = −
7(2(e − c) + (3 + binr (3 + 2(bir + binr)))d)
10 + bir (5 + 2bir) + binr (4 + bir) + b2
inr
< 0.
Next observe that, after simpliﬁcation,

















Adopting the same basic approach used to simplify Ξ1, we then have
Φ1 = −
7(2(e − c) − (5 + binr (3 + 2(bir + binr)))d)
10 + bir (5 + 2bir) + binr (4 + bir) + b2
inr
37We can see straight away that for d = 0 it is the case that Φ1 < 0, and that Φ1 is increasing
in d. We then ﬁnd by substitution that for d = (e − c)/22, bir = 3 and binr = 2, it is the case
that Φ1 = 0. It follows immediately that Φ1 < 0 for all b1r ∈ {1,2,3} and b1nr ∈ {0,1,2}
and d ∈ [0,(e − c)/22).
















































































Using the functions for tir (bir,binr), tir (b0
ir,b0
inr), tinr (bir,binr) and tinr (b0
ir,b0
inr), substitution
reveals that the second order condition is negative for all feasible values b0
1r ∈ {1,2,3} and
b0
1nr ∈ {0,1,2,3}, given d ∈ [0,(e − c)/22).
Proof of Proposition 5. Without loss of generality, take country 1 as an example. (The
cases for all other countries are analogous.) Write down two welfare functions for country 1:
w1 {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}} and w1 {{1,4,5,6},{2,3}}. The ﬁrst measures the welfare of country
1 when it is in a regional TA and all countries in the other region are in a second regional TA.
The second welfare function measures welfare when country 1 joins a TA with the countries
in the other region while countries 2 and 3 form a TA. To calculate w1 {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}},
note that country 1 sets a tariﬀ t∗
inr (3,0) on all imports from the other region, and country
1’s exports also face t∗
inr (3,0) from all countries in the other region. Trade within regions is






2 − 134(e − c)d + 1072d2
2450
For w1 {{1,4,5,6},{2,3}}, country 1 sets t∗
ir (1,3) on imports from non-members in its own
region. country 1’s exports face tariﬀs t∗
ir (2,0) from non-members in its own region. Trade
between country 1 and the countries in the other region is free. Using these tariﬀs in (2.7)-





2 − 44336(e − c)d + 92225d2
163592
.
We can now see that
w1 {{1,4,5,6},{2,3}} > w1 {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}} for d = 0;
w1 {{1,4,5,6},{2,3}} < w1 {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}} for d = (e − c)/22.
We can also see that both w1 {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}} and w1 {{1,4,5,6},{2,3}} are decreasing
in d for d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22) but w1 {{1,4,5,6},{2,3}} is decreasing more rapidly. So we











(e − c) ' 0.017(e − c)

Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 2, member welfare of a given TA is decreasing in
the size of each of the other TAs that exist. Therefore, the highest feasible level of welfare is
achieved when a country is a member of a TA and all non-members of its TA are singletons.
It remains to establish the TA structure that maximizes member welfare (given that all
non-members are singletons). The result is seen clearly if we take each case in turn, starting
with the smallest possible TA and increasing its size while evaluating member welfare at
each point. First, it follows from Proposition 3 that if two singletons form a two-member
TA this must increase member welfare. We now establish that if both members are in
the same region this yields a higher level of welfare than if each member is in a diﬀerent
region. Without loss of generality, assume that country 1 forms a 2-country TA either
with country 2 in its own region or with country 4 in the other region. Welfare would be
w1 {{1,2},{3},{4},{5},{6}} or w1 {{1,4},{2},{4},{5},{6}} respectively. To calculate
w1 {{1,2},{3},{4},{5},{6}}, note that country 1 levies a tariﬀ t∗
ir (2,0) and t∗
inr (2,0) on
imports from regional and non-regional non-members respectively. The non-member from
R1 levies a tariﬀ t∗
ir (1,0) on imports from country 1, and non-members from R2 levy a
tariﬀ t∗
inr (1,0) on imports from country 1. Substituting these tariﬀs into (2.7)-(2.10) and
substituting appropriately into (2.11) yields
w1 {{1,2},{3},{4},{5},{6}} =
889(e − c)
2 − 999(e − c)d + 2205d2
1859
.
39To calculate w1 {{1,4},{2},{4},{5},{6}}, note that country 1 levies a tariﬀ t∗
ir (1,1) and
t∗
inr (1,1) on imports from regional and non-regional non-members respectively. The non-
members from R1 levy t∗
ir (1,0) on imports from country 1, and non-members from R2
levy t∗
inr (1,0) on imports from country 1. Substituting these tariﬀs into (2.7)-(2.10) and
substituting appropriately into (2.11) yields
w1 {{1,4},{2},{4},{5},{6}} =
7112(e − c)
2 − 4404(e − c)d + 16431d2
14872
.
Welfare under the two TA conﬁgurations is equal for d = 0 and the latter yields a lower level
of welfare for d > 0, with the diﬀerence increasing in the size of d.
The same basic approach can be used to establish that the 3-member TA that maximizes
a member’s welfare is where all members are in the same region, and that a 3-member regional
TA yields a higher level of per-member welfare than a 2-member regional TA:
w1 ({1,2,3},{4},{5},{6}) =
5787(e − c)
2 − 3114(e − c)d + 13362d2
11830
.
We can also calculate the level of welfare of country 1 if a non-regional member is included;
w1 {{1,2,3,4},{5},{6}}. In that case, country 1 imposes a tariﬀ t∗
inr (3,1) on imports
from non-members, and non-members impose a tariﬀ t∗
inr (1,0) on imports from country




2 − 262(e − c)d + 915d2
676
.
We can now see that
w1 {{1,2,3,4},{5},{6}} > w1 {{1,2,3},{4},{5},{6}} for d = 0
w1 {{1,2,3,4},{5},{6}} < w1 {{1,2,3},{4},{5},{6}} for d = (e − c)/22.
We can also see that w1 {{1,2,3,4},{5,6}} is declining in d for d ∈ (0,(e − c)/22). So we








(e − c) ' 0.029(e − c).
Finally, we must check that a 5-member TA does not yield a higher level of welfare than
either a 4-member TA or a 3-member TA. As for all previous cases, a member obtains a
40higher payoﬀ if all countries in its own region are members of the TA. Thus
w1 {{1,2,3,4,5},{6}} =
12145(e − c)
2 − 11262(e − c)d + 37450d2
24674
.
Since w1 {{1,2,3,4},{5,6}} > w1 {{1,2,3,4,5},{6}} for d = 0, and since w1 {{1,2,3,4,5},{6}}
has a steeper negative slope in d than w1 {{1,2,3,4},{5,6}}, it follows that w1 {{1,2,3,4},{5},{6}} >
w1 {{1,2,3,4,5},{6}} for all d ∈ [0,(e − c)/22). Similar calculations show that free trade
yields a lower level of per-member welfare than w1 {{1,2,3,4},{5},{6}} and w1 {{1,2,3},{4},{5},{6}}.
Proof of Proposition 7. There are two cases to consider; d ∈ (0,d00) and d ∈ [d00,(e − c)/22).
As in the main text, take d ∈ [d00,(e − c)/22) ﬁrst. Given that all countries are singletons
in the previous period, by Proposition 5, each country i writes down a strategy si listing
itself and the two other countries in its region. Thus, each country in R1 names every other
country in R1 in its strategy. Symmetrically, again by Proposition 5, each country in R2
names every other country in R2 in its strategy. Therefore, the intersecting set of countries
formed by the strategies of countries in R1 is R1 itself. So we have a regional TA, B1 = R1.
Symmetrically, the intersecting set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R2 is
R2 itself. So we have a second regional TA, B2 = R2. A deviation by country 1 would then
yield welfare w1 {{1,2},{3},{4,5,6}} or w1 {{1},{2,3},{4,5,6}}, neither of which would
be proﬁtable relative to w1 {{1,2,3},{4,5,6}}. The result follows.
Now take d ∈ (0,d00). Given that all countries are singletons in the previous period, by
Proposition 5, each country i writes down a strategy si listing itself, the two other countries
in its region, and one country from the other region. Thus, each country in R1 names
every other country in R1 in its strategy plus one country from R2. Symmetrically, again
by Proposition 5, each country in R2 names every other country in R2 in its strategy plus
one country from R1. But no country in R1 names every country in R2 and no country in
R2 names every country in R1. Therefore, the intersecting set of countries formed by the
strategies of countries in R1 is R1 itself. So we have a regional TA, B1 = R1. Symmetrically,
the intersecting set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R2 is R2 itself. So
we have a second regional TA, B2 = R2. The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 8. By Proposition 4, aggregate member welfare increases when a
TA expands from 3 members to 6 members (free trade). The two regional TAs, B1 = R1
and B2 = R2 are symmetrical, so each country has the same welfare. Thus, the welfare of
every country must be increased by the merging of the two 3-country TAs to bring about
41free trade. Moreover, no country can gain by deviation because a veto of the grand coalition
must result in a return to the TA structure of B1 = R1 and B2 = R2. 
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